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Transformation toward a Global Governance Institution: How the United Nations Responds to the Impact of Major-Powers Political Intervention on Its Operational Effectiveness

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Abstract: The year 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. However, as the foremost platform for the practice of multilateralism, the United Nations has frequently been subjected to interference arising from unilateral actions, particularly those associated with unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States, thereby constraining the normal functioning of the Organization. The essence of this predicament lies in the fact that the United Nations, as an institution established upon the foundation of sovereign states, derives its autonomy closely from the authorization granted by member states—especially major powers possessing substantial capabilities, whose substantive delegation provides critical resource support for United Nations actions. Once the actions undertaken by the United Nations in fulfillment of its purposes and principles cease to align with the interests of major powers or their pursuit of the maximization of their own interests, such powers often seek to reduce or terminate delegation in order to curtail the resources available for relevant United Nations activities, thereby undermining the foundations of the Organization’s autonomy and consequently affecting its operational effectiveness and institutional functions. Therefore, current United Nations reform should actively promote the Organization’s transformation into a global governance institution, facilitating a shift in its international role orientation from a traditional “guarantor of collective security” toward that of a “global agenda advocate.” By relying upon its professionalism and broad influence as a multilateral platform, the United Nations may shape corresponding moral and normative principles surrounding global agendas so as to reduce excessive dependence upon major-power delegation, thereby enhancing its global governance capacity, strengthening the resilience of its institutions, and mitigating the disruptive impact of major powers’ political intervention on the operational effectiveness of the United Nations.

Keywords: Global governance; United nations; Major-power political intervention; Operational effectiveness

1 Introduction

The United Nations, as a non- “supranational” organization established under the framework of sovereign states, seeks to leverage the pivotal role of major powers while operating on the principle of equality among all sovereign members. In practice, however, the current state-centric governance model has rendered the United Nations’ normal functioning frequently vulnerable to interference arising from unilateral actions, particularly those associated with unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States, when confronting complex and rapidly evolving international situations. Therefore, on the occasion of its 80th anniversary, the “UN 80th Anniversary Initiative” has catalyzed a renewed phase of UN reform aimed at achieving the “maximum effectiveness” of the Organization—thereby better maintaining international peace and security, promoting global development and cooperation, and advancing the common development of humanity. Against this backdrop, examining how the United Nations currently responds to the impact of major powers’ political intervention on its operational effectiveness is of critical importance for enabling the Organization to more fully fulfill and implement its purposes and principles in the future.

Existing research on the relationship between the United Nations and major-power politics has primarily analyzed the mutual influence mechanisms between the two, proposing, for instance, reforms to the Security Council such as increasing its representative seats or regulating the use of the veto to address major-power political intervention. Related studies on the United Nations in the global governance domain have also explored the linkage between enhancing the Organization’s effectiveness and its transformation toward a global governance institution. Building upon these two strands of research, this study employs a principal–agent framework to analyze the interaction between states and international organizations, offering an in-depth examination of the fundamental dynamics between the United Nations and major-power politics and the deeper logic underlying its operational effectiveness. On this basis, the study further investigates the mechanisms through which the United Nations’ transformation into a global governance institution may mitigate the disruptive impact of major-power political intervention on its operational effectiveness.

2 Major-Power Politics and the Operational Effectiveness of the United Nations

2.1 An Analysis Based on the Principal–Agent Framework

In response to the effectiveness deficit within the global governance system, the “UN80 Initiative” seeks to achieve rapid improvements in operational effectiveness and operational performance under the existing framework. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has likewise emphasized the neces-

sity of adopting more streamlined, coordinated, and efficient approaches in pursuit of the Organization's "maximum effectiveness." As the world's largest international organization, the United Nations comprises 193 Member States and possesses an extensive institutional system encompassing numerous organs and agencies. Consequently, effectively managing the principal-agent relationship between Member States and the United Nations, together with its vast institutional system, is of critical importance to the operational effectiveness of the Organization.

According to the core assumptions of principal-agent theory, states constitute rational principals, whereas international organizations function as rational agents. In order to safeguard their own interests, pursue the maximization of their interests, and reduce the costs they incur, Member States delegate authority to international organizations through substantive delegation, authorizing them to undertake actions consistent with their purposes and principles. However, international organizations are neither instruments fully controlled by their Member States nor inherently natural facilitators of cooperation. Their foremost concern is not the realization of the goals and interests of Member States, but rather the maximization of their own interests in institutional survival and development. Although powerful states often retain decisive influence over the survival interests of international organizations, once substantive delegation has been granted and concerns over organizational survival are alleviated, international organizations may utilize their autonomy to gradually develop and express preference structures independent of those of Member States through ongoing interactions, thereby becoming self-interested actors independent of the preferences of their Member States. Therefore, authorization from Member States—particularly from major powers possessing substantial capabilities—constitutes the prerequisite and foundation for the institutional operation of international organizations. Once major powers reduce or terminate delegation, the foundations of the United Nations' institutional autonomy become constrained, and its operational effectiveness is consequently and inevitably affected.

2.2 The Dynamics between the United Nations and Major-Power Politics

The foundation of the United Nations lies in its character as a non- "supranational" organization established upon the basis of sovereign states. Moreover, Roosevelt's original vision in establishing the United Nations was to preserve world peace through solidarity among the major powers. The institutional arrangements of the United Nations concerning the Security Council and the veto mechanism constitute the institutional safeguard for great-power consensus. From the perspective of the principal-agent model, major powers possess substantial capabilities, and their delegation provides the United Nations with critical resources for its operations, including political influence, financial support, and the majority of military forces for peacekeeping operations. Such delegation contributes to enhancing the autonomy of the United Nations in undertaking actions consistent with its purposes and principles, thereby promoting

the operational effectiveness of the Organization. However, whether major powers are willing to actively fulfill their important responsibilities within the United Nations—namely, delegating authority and providing essential resources support for actions aimed at maintaining international peace and security and promoting international development and cooperation—is ultimately determined by their own interests and strategic calculations. When the actions undertaken by the United Nations in fulfillment of its purposes and principles align with the interests of major powers, such powers tend to play an active role in enhancing the effectiveness of relevant United Nations actions, thereby advancing and safeguarding their interests. Conversely, when such actions fail to conform to the interests of major powers, these states may intervene in or obstruct the implementation of relevant United Nations actions, thereby undermining the operational effectiveness of the Organization.

2.3 Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Major-Power Political Intervention on United Nations Operational Effectiveness

Under the ideal conditions envisioned at the founding of the United Nations, Member States—particularly major powers possessing substantial capabilities—would, through substantive delegation, authorize the Organization to autonomously undertake actions consistent with its purposes and principles. The autonomous characteristics of the United Nations would thereby enhance its operational effectiveness and effectively advance the continued promotion of the common interests of Member States. In actual practice, however, particularly amid the profound transformations associated with the accelerated development of world multipolarity and economic globalization, strategic competition and interest-based bargaining among major powers have rendered them either unwilling to delegate authority to the United Nations or unable to reach consensus on relevant United Nations decisions and actions. Yet, according to principal–agent theory, delegation by the principals constitutes the prerequisite and foundation for the operation of the agent. Consequently, principals—especially major powers wielding substantial influence within the United Nations—has adopted various countermeasures against the Organization through the withdrawal or restriction of delegation, including the exertion of financial pressure, the reduction or suspension of financial contributions to the United Nations, the irrational abuse of the veto within Security Council decision-making processes, as well as the frequent withdrawal from United Nations-related agencies or entities, thereby directly undermining the principal–agent relationship. Fundamentally, these actions constrain and diminish the autonomous capacity of the United Nations, thereby reducing and impairing its operational effectiveness. In particular, interference arising from unilateral actions associated with unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States has repeatedly undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations and its institutional system in implementing their purposes and principles. The reason why the United Nations has found it difficult to escape the influence of major-power political intervention throughout the operation of the principal–

agent relationship lies in the Organization's longstanding international role orientation as a "guarantor of collective security," which is premised upon the expectation that major powers should assume core responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.




Figure 1: Pathways of Major-Power Erosion of UN Operational Effectiveness under the Principal-Agent Framework (Source: Compiled by the author.)

During the immediate post-Second World War period and throughout the Cold War, the United Nations primarily relied upon the collective security mechanism to address threats within the realm of traditional security, prevent the recurrence of large-scale wars, and mitigate regional conflicts. In this context, the United Nations positioned its international role as that of a "guarantor of collective security," with its institutional functions primarily concentrated on the maintenance of international peace and security. As the principal providers of resources for the maintenance of international peace

and security, major powers constituted an essential component of the United Nations collective security mechanism. However, as the interconnection between traditional and non-traditional security issues has continued to deepen and global challenges have become increasingly complex, the United Nations has failed to substantially adjust or transform its longstanding international role orientation as a “guarantor of collective security.” Under the inertia of the existing institutional framework, the United Nations and its institutional system continue to depend upon critical resources provided by major powers, thereby further intensifying the influence of major-power politics on the Organization’s operational effectiveness. Once actions undertaken by the United Nations in fulfillment of its purposes and principles cease to align with the interests of certain major powers, the constraining effect of major-power political intervention on the operational effectiveness of the United Nations correspondingly intensifies. Contemporary unilateral practices associated with unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States and their interference in the operation of the United Nations constitute a clear manifestation of this dynamic.




Figure 2: The Operational Logic of the United Nations under the Role Orientation of “Guarantor of Collective Security” (Source: Compiled by the author.)

From the outbreak of the latest round of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict on 7 October 2023 to the conclusion of the first-phase ceasefire agreement on 9 October 2025, the United States continuously interfered with the United Nations’ efforts to fulfill its purpose of maintaining international peace and security in pursuit of its own strategic interests. Throughout this process, the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, repeatedly exercised its veto power on resolutions concerning the peaceful settlement of the conflict, even in cases where no other members of the Council expressed opposition. These draft resolutions included provisions calling for an immediate ceasefire between the parties, the implementation of humanitarian ceasefires, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, due to the United States’ repeated use and politicized application of the veto, the United Nations Security Council—which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security—was unable to reach consensus on these matters. From the perspective of principal–agent theory, this reflected the obstruction by the principals (major powers) of the adoption of substantive Security Council resolutions at the level of authorization and decision-making. As a consequence, the United Nations lacked the condition of “great-power consensus” as one of the essential guarantees for its operation, thereby constraining the capacity of the agent (the United Nations) to exercise institutional agency. Consequently, the operational effectiveness of the United Nations was significantly undermined by intervention associated with unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States. Moreover, conflict-prevention and peacekeeping operations likewise faced difficulties in obtaining essential resource support due to the Security Council’s failure to achieve consensus, thereby limiting their functional effectiveness.

Table 1: Draft Resolution Numbers Vetoed by the United States in the Security Council during the Latest Palestinian–Israeli Conflict

Country	Type of Conflict	Security Council Resolution Vetoed (Number)
United States	New Round of Israeli–Palestinian Conflict	S/PV.10000, S/PV.9929, S/PV.9790, S/PV.9552, S/PV.9499, S/PV.9442

Source: Security Council - Veto List. <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto>.

Moreover, beyond its repeated use of the veto in the Security Council, the United States, as the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, has also exerted fiscal pressure on the Organization through the delayed payment, partial payment, or non-payment of assessed contributions. As of 24 September 2025, the United States owed nearly US\$3 billion in outstanding contributions to the United Nations. The accumulation of these arrears has generated significant funding shortfalls in the Organization’s operations. On 17 October 2025, Secretary-General António Guterres submitted the proposed programme budget for 2026 to the Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which is responsible for adminis-

trative and budgetary matters. The proposed regular budget amounted to US\$3.238 billion, representing a reduction of nearly US\$500 million from the original proposal and a decrease of 15.1 percent compared with the approved 2025 budget. As a consequence, the revised budget proposal reduced the number of posts from more than 13,800 positions in the original proposal—including over 10,000 regular posts and more than 3,000 positions related to special political missions—to fewer than 11,600 posts, representing an 18.8 percent decrease compared with 2025 levels. These reductions were concentrated primarily in large departments and administrative functions. Such cuts will undoubtedly have a direct impact on the operational effectiveness of relevant United Nations activities. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, when major powers reduce or suspend financial delegation, they unilaterally constrain the fiscal resources necessary for the operation of the United Nations, thereby reducing the material resources available to the Organization for its activities. Under conditions in which material resources are insufficient to sustain the normal functioning of the Organization, the United Nations is compelled to alter its operational priorities, which in turn constrains its capacity to exercise institutional agency. As Secretary-General Guterres has observed, the current financial outlook of the United Nations is “extremely fragile.” High levels of arrears, delayed payments, and the return of credits are threatening the Organization’s cash flow and weakening its core operational capacity. Without agreement on measures to address the deteriorating liquidity crisis, key United Nations programmes will face serious risks.

Table 2: U.S. Outstanding, Assessed and Paid Contributions to the United Nations, 2015–2024 (in Hundreds of Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Outstanding Contributions (as of Sept. 30)	Assessed Contributions (Current Year)	Paid Contributions (Current Year)
2015	8.13	6.55	7.24
2016	7.86	5.94	6.21
2017	8.65	6.11	5.32
2018	8.42	5.91	6.14
2019	10.55	6.74	4.61
2020	10.90	6.79	6.44
2021	10.02	6.99	7.87
2022	9.15	6.93	7.80
2023	9.30	7.08	6.93
2024	9.95	7.62	6.97

Source: Zhang Guihong. (2025). The United Nations at Eighty: Retrospect, Challenges, and Prospects. *The Journal of International Studies*. (04),24.

In addition, the United States has also obstructed the functioning of the United Nations by withdrawing from relevant bodies and agencies within the UN system and by freezing related funding. Prior to the conclusion of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the Trump administration issued an executive order in early February 2025 terminating U.S. membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and prohibiting any future funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Although the United States had long been the largest donor to UNRWA, contributing approximately US\$300–400 million annually, former President Biden had already suspended funding in January 2024, after which the U.S. Congress formally halted contributions to UNRWA, with the funding freeze remaining in effect at least until March 2025. President Trump further asserted that UNRWA had been exposed for multiple instances of “corruption” and declared that the United States would permanently withdraw from the organization. In early January 2026, the United States further announced its intention to withdraw from 31 United Nations agencies and entities, including UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), as well as several Secretariat offices at United Nations Headquarters in New York, including the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The list of withdrawals also extended to four of the United Nations’ five regional commissions—the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)—which have long served as key platforms for regional multilateral cooperation. Such actions by the United States not only fundamentally undermined its principal–agent relationships with relevant United Nations agencies and entities, but also compelled these institutions to incur additional administrative costs in responding to unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States. At the same time, these organizations were required to address the fiscal shortfalls resulting from the freezing of U.S. funding. The combined pressures of financial constraints and political intervention jointly eroded the autonomous foundations underpinning the operational effectiveness of the United Nations. Consequently, the normal functioning of the Organization has faced severe challenges under major-power political intervention by the United States, and its operational effectiveness has inevitably been adversely affected. Moreover, a series of recent unilateral initiatives associated with U.S. hegemonic practices—including the so-called “Board of Peace” and proposals concerning the incorporation of Greenland into the United States—have further intensified the complexity and uncertainty of the international situation. Therefore, actively responding to the impact of major-power political intervention has become an urgent imperative for safeguarding the operational effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security and promoting

international development and cooperation. In this context, the transformation of the United Nations into a global governance institution has become increasingly necessary.

3 Transforming the United Nations into a Global Governance Institution: Enhancing Institutional Resilience

3.1 Enhancing the Resilience of United Nations Operations Contributes to Mitigating the Impact of Major-Power Political Intervention on Its Operational Effectiveness

The interactive relationship between the United Nations and major-power politics reflects both the foundational structure and the original purposes underlying the establishment of the Organization, upon which its international “role” as a “guarantor of collective security” was constructed. However, this interactional dynamic also renders the United Nations vulnerable to recurrent interference from major-power politics whenever tensions emerge between the Organization and the interests of major powers, thereby obstructing the normal functioning of the United Nations and diminishing its operational effectiveness. Against the backdrop of rising anti-globalization trends, the United Nations’ traditional operational framework as a “guarantor of collective security” has become increasingly inadequate for addressing an increasingly complex and fluid global governance environment. Therefore, the United Nations should actively advance its transformation into a global governance institution and promote a corresponding shift in its international “role” from a “guarantor of collective security” to a “global agenda advocate.” By enhancing its governance capacity, the Organization can strengthen its institutional resilience so as to absorb the disruptive impacts of unilateral hegemonic practices undertaken by major powers, particularly the United States, on the operational effectiveness of the United Nations, thereby reducing the extent to which major-power political intervention affects the Organization’s normal functioning. Such a transformation would open new pathways for the United Nations to operate more effectively and flexibly in response to an increasingly complex and evolving international environment, thereby advancing the realization of the Organization’s “maximum effectiveness.” Nevertheless, one crucial point must be emphasized: although the transformation of the United Nations into a global governance institution—and its corresponding “role” as a “global agenda advocate”—may reduce the impact of major-power political intervention on the Organization’s operational effectiveness, it does not alter the foundational basis upon which the United Nations was established. Major-power politics remains an integral component of the United Nations system, and the constructive role played by major powers continues to provide an important driving force for the Organization’s fulfillment of its purposes and principles.

The transformation of the United Nations into a global governance institution, together with the shift in its international “role” toward that of a “global agenda advocate,” can reduce the impact of major-power political intervention on the Organization’s operational effectiveness precisely because its operations are no

longer predominantly shaped by authorization from major powers. In other words, under the international “role” of a “guarantor of collective security,” the United Nations depends upon the central role of major powers in maintaining international peace and security—that is, substantive authorization from major powers serves as a critical guarantee for the implementation and execution of relevant United Nations actions, thereby enabling major-power politics to significantly influence the Organization’s operational processes. By contrast, under the international “role” of a “global agenda advocate,” the United Nations actively leverages its professional expertise and extensive global influence as the world’s largest, most authoritative, representative, and universal intergovernmental organization in order to advocate global agendas that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and aligned with the common interests of humanity, thereby fostering corresponding moral and normative principles. Compared with traditional coercive measures, the normative appeal of such moral and normative principle does not depend upon substantive authorization from major powers. For the operation of the United Nations, this means that regardless of whether major powers play a constructive role or engage in interventionist behavior, the influence of moral and normative principle grounded in the common interests of humanity can continue to function independently. More systematically, the United Nations can rely upon its own informational networks and professional expertise to enhance the legitimacy and moral appeal of the global agendas it advocates, thereby strengthening its institutional resilience and absorbing the disruptive effects of major-power political intervention. In turn, this expands the Organization’s capacity for institutional autonomy and enhances its operational effectiveness. Furthermore, once major powers politically interfere with the normal functioning of the United Nations, such self-interested behavior may become subject to international criticism through the mobilizing influence of moral and normative principle formed during the United Nations’ advocacy of humanity’s common interests. This, in turn, generates international reputational pressure that raises the moral costs of political intervention by major powers in the normal operations of the United Nations as it fulfills its purposes and principles, thereby reducing the extent to which major-power political intervention undermines the Organization’s operational effectiveness.

3.2 Enhancing the Resilience of United Nations Operations Requires the Utilization of Soft Governance Mechanisms

In response to major-power political intervention, the United Nations seeks to enhance its institutional resilience through its transformation into a global governance institution, thereby reducing the impact of major-power political intervention on its operational effectiveness. In this process, the United Nations must fully utilize the distinctive function of a global governance institution—namely, soft governance mechanisms—which constitute the governance logic of the Organization under its international “role” as a “global agenda advocate.”

As the representative organ of all Member States of the United Nations, the powers and functions assigned to the General Assembly under the Charter of the United Nations embody a value-oriented commitment to promoting the common development of humanity on the basis of sovereign equality and cooperative engagement. In practice, the General Assembly's one-state, one-vote majority decision-making system, together with its cooperative mechanisms with specialized agencies of the United Nations, facilitates the coordination of sovereign states preferences and promotes interaction in both political and functional cooperation among states. Accordingly, the General Assembly constitutes a central institutional arena through which the United Nations exercises soft governance mechanisms. The powers and functions of the General Assembly reflect the normative justice embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and its fundamental principles, thereby providing moral support for the Assembly's soft law-making activities and establishing a foundation of legitimacy for strengthening their practical effectiveness. At the same time, the principle of sovereign equality in General Assembly decision-making also shapes the substantive value and internal legitimacy of its soft-law creation. Under the framework of soft law-making by the General Assembly, the range of actors participating in the operation of the United Nations becomes increasingly diverse, which contributes to enhancing consultative deliberation and democratic participation in the processes of policy formulation, resolution adoption, and implementation within the United Nations system. This provides participating states with opportunities to express their respective positions and continuously engage in communication, coordination, and mediation—that is, to exercise soft governance mechanisms—thereby transforming one-shot games among states into repeated games. Within the long-term environment of repeated interaction, the global agendas advocated by the United Nations—namely, promoting the common interests of humanity through the maintenance of international peace and security and the advancement of international development and cooperation—are highly consistent with the interests of rational states. Consequently, this helps incentivize Member States to participate more actively in the operation of the United Nations, thereby enhancing its operational effectiveness. Furthermore, once Member States actively participate in actions undertaken by the United Nations to fulfill its purposes and principles, the Organization's influence can be further expanded and corresponding moral and normative principles can gradually be constructed. Even if major powers rely upon their superior capabilities to interfere in the operation of the United Nations without directly undermining their own material interests, such behavior—as discussed previously—will nevertheless be subject to international criticism under the normative appeal generated by the United Nations. The resulting international reputational pressure will continuously increase the reputational and political costs of major-power intervention in the normal functioning of the United Nations. Consequently, major powers will either need to incur greater costs in order to achieve their previously expected intervention outcomes, or experience diminished intervention effectiveness under the same level of intervention costs as before. In turn, this reduces the disruptive impact of major-power political intervention on the operational effectiveness of the United Nations. (Figure 3)




Figure 3: The Governance Logic of the United Nations in Mitigating Major-Power Political Intervention through Transformation toward a Global Governance Institution under Its International Role as a "Global Agenda Advocate" (Source: Compiled by the author.)

Therefore, the exercise of the United Nations' soft governance mechanisms through soft law-making by the General Assembly constitutes the key pathway through which the Organization can transform into a global governance institution and evolve into a "global agenda advocate," thereby generating corresponding moral and normative principles, strengthening its institutional resilience, and ultimately reducing the impact of major-power political intervention on its operational effectiveness.

4 Conclusion

At present, the world is undergoing profound transformations unseen in a century, while the global governance system is facing severe challenges. In particular, the foreign policy of the United States during Donald Trump's second presidential term has increasingly embodied the core logic of "America First." Various forms of U.S. intervention in the affairs and operation of the United Nations reflect an increasingly pronounced dynamic of strategic competition among major powers and further reveal the unilateralist characteristics of unilateral hegemonic practices of the United States. Although the United Nations was frequently constrained by the bipolar structure of U.S.–Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, the deepening intensity of major-power political intervention is likely to generate increasingly significant disruptive effects on the Organization's operational effectiveness in fulfilling its purposes and principles. At the same time, major-power politics itself remains an essential foundation for the establishment and operation of the United Nations. Consequently, effectively managing the impact of major-power political intervention on the operational effectiveness of the United Nations has become a central issue in the Organization's pursuit of "maximum effectiveness." By transforming toward a global governance institution and strengthening its institutional resilience, the United Nations can not only continue to facilitate the constructive role of major powers within the Organization, but also enhance its capacity to mitigate the disruptive effects of major-power political intervention on its operational effectiveness. Such a transformation would open new pathways for the United Nations to better respond to an increasingly complex and highly uncertain global environment, thereby advancing the common development and shared prosperity of humanity.

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None.

Author Contributions

Yeyuan Li: The author confirms sole responsibility for the following: study conception and design, data collection, analysis and interpretation of results, and manuscript preparation.

Availability of Data and Materials

The data on which the study is based were accessed from a repository and are available for downloading through the following link.

<https://news.un.org/zh/story/2025/05/1138526;>
<https://news.un.org/zh/story/2025/10/1140923;>
<http://usa.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0924/c241376-40570932.html;>
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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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