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Cost Imposition, Misaligned Gaming Strategies and Risk Deferral: The Practical Logic and Security Dilemma of the U.S. Strategic Competition Policy towards China’s Semiconductor Industry


Ximing Wang1, Hongchang Liu2,*

School of National Security, University of International Relations, Beijing, China
School of National Security, University of International Relations, Beijing, China
Correspondence: Hongchang Liu, E-mail: liuerboger@uir.edu.cn
 
J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov., 2024, 1(8), 4-26; https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.240414
Received : 21 Oct 2024 / Revised : 03 Nov 2024 / Accepted : 03 Nov 2024 / Published : 31 Dec 2024
© The Author(s). Published by MOSP. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
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Abstract
 
Semiconductor industry, as a cornerstone of the digital economy, holds a vital position in cutting-edge technology fields such as electronic information engineering, communication systems, aerospace technology, and artificial intelligence. It has developed into a comprehensive system encompassing global supply chains, industrial chains, and value chains. It has formed a comprehensive system of global supply chains, industrial chains, and value chains. The United States and China serve as the primary drivers of the global semiconductor industry. To maintain its industrial dominance and technological hegemony, the U.S. has implemented a series of policies centered on “cost imposition” as part of its strategic competition policy against China, particularly in areas where the U.S. has a significant presence, namely innovation and development within this industry. By constructing a model of limited rationality risk game and conducting empirical analyses, it is demonstrated that the U.S. strategic competition policy towards China constitutes a non-optimal strategy under risk games characterized by a significant misalignment. This policy exerts a dual impact on the U.S. economy, manifesting as “small cycle advantages” and “large trend risks”, resulting in a difficult-to-prevent “lag” effect. Additionally, it also underscores the temporal mismatch and cyclical imbalance inherent in the U.S.’s strategic competition approach, exacerbating the security dilemmas faced by the international community.
 
Keywords: Semiconductor Industry, China-US Strategic Competition, Cost Imposition, Game Strategy Misalignment, Risk Deferral, Security Dilemmas
 
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Funding

    None.

Conflicts of Interest:

    The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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© The Author(s). Published by MOSP
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
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