The emergence of a new phase in the technological revolution has intensified U.S.-China technological competition, centered on power rivalry, with American high-tech interest groups actively shaping U.S. technology strategy towards China. This paper employs the neoclassical realist framework to analyze the internal logic driving the actions of these interest groups regarding China-focused technology policies. The increased competitiveness of China's high-tech industries has heightened their perceived threat, prompting interventions through multiple lobbying channels to achieve three core political objectives. Although significant successes have been attained, such efforts remain constrained by systemic countervailing forces. Given the growing influence of interest groups on U.S. technology policy towards China, China must expand its strategic toolkit for interest balancing, cultivate external countervailing capabilities, and deploy multidimensional strategies to address the challenges posed by technological competition.

Keywords: High-Tech Interest Groups, China Policy, Technological Competition, Neoclassical Realism

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The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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The Influence of U.S. High-Tech Interest Groups on the Formation of American Technology Policy toward China: Motivations, Pathways, and Limitations (2018–2024)