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Article

Relationalism and Technological Hegemony: A Case Study of Sino-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Industry Competition

Xingyu Qian1,*

1 Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin, China
* Correspondence: Xingyu Qian, E-mail: 2012575@mail.nankai.edu.cn
 
J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov., 2025, 2(6), 52-73; https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250842
Received : 02 Sep 2025 / Revised : 14 Sep 2025 / Accepted : 23 Sep 2025 / Published : 25 Sep 2025
© The Author(s). Published by MOSP. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
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Abstract
 
Relationalism emphasizes the primacy of maintaining cooperative processes, while technological hegemony seeks to safeguard dominant states’ interests by suppressing challengers. This paper conceptualizes suppression as a phenomenon within the process of maintaining relationship, and attempts to explain competitions in the semiconductor industry by relationality or guanxi and case study between Sino-U.S. and U.S.-Japan. The existence of a differential pattern generates importance and intimacy, as well as technical and security relations. Importance and intimacy lead to cooperation, while technology and security relationships influence each other. The changes in security relations will affect technological relations. Faced with the importance oriented Sino-U.S. technological relations and the intimacy oriented U.S.- Japan technological relations, the United States has adopted strategies of limited Mencius Optimality and reversed Confucian Improvement to balance the relationship, with the aim of obtaining maximum benefits in maintaining cooperation. However, the suppression measures of technological hegemony may not necessarily benefit oneself, and may even cause greater losses, resulting in a common failure among relevant parties. Only maintaining the smooth operation of the cooperation process is conducive to forming a harmonious overall relationship, thereby achieving win-win results.
 
Keywords: Relationality, Technological Hegemony, Semiconductor Industry, Confucian Improvement, Mencius Optimality
 
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Funding

None.

Conflicts of Interest:

    The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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Qian, X. Relationalism and Technological Hegemony: A Case Study of Sino-U.S. and U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Industry Competition. Journal of International Economy and Global Governance 2025, 2 (6), 52-73. https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250842.

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